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The Hindenburg Disaster: Combining 
Physics and History in the Laboratory
Gregory A. DiLisi, John Carroll University, University Heights, OH
This May marks the 80th anniversary of the Hin-denburg disaster. On May 
6, 1937, the German passenger 
zeppelin Hindenburg, hovering 
300 feet in the air and held aloft by 
seven million cubic feet of hydro-
gen gas, burst into flames while 
preparing to dock at the Naval 
Air Station in Lakehurst, NJ (Fig. 
1). Amazingly, the ensuing fire 
consumed the massive airship in 
only 35 seconds! In the aftermath, 
35 of 97 people onboard died (13 
passengers and 22 crewmen) plus 
one member of the ground crew. 
Herbert Morrison, the broadcaster 
from Chicago’s WLS radio station, was on assignment that day 
covering the arrival of the majestic airship. Morrison’s eyewit-
ness account of the disaster is legendary audio history. In fact, 
Morrison’s phrase, “Oh, the humanity!” has become a cultural 
idiom.
We present the Hindenburg disaster as a case study in the 
flammability of fabrics. Our goal is to examine the ship’s outer 
covering and decide whether or not it was the fire’s initial 
source of fuel. To accomplish this, we piloted a basic vertical 
flame test with students in an introductory-level undergradu-
ate laboratory. Our test is patterned after the protocol set forth 
by the American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) 
for determining the flammability of textiles. The case study 
provides several unique teaching opportunities.
First, we observe the anniversary of this tragedy by bring-
ing it to the attention of a new generation of students, namely, 
those currently enrolled in our courses. We provided students 
with background information on the ship’s design, final 
voyage, and destruction. We used excerpts from Morrison’s 
account to headline sections of our case study to more artisti-
cally portray historical events. Reexamining a major historical 
event is a powerful means of piquing students’ interest, par-
ticularly those who are more disposed to a liberal arts focus.
Although we piloted this case study in an introductory-
level laboratory setting, its interdisciplinary nature has broad 
appeal, making it suitable for introductory physics and engi-
neering courses, senior-level courses on engineering ethics, 
and courses involving flammability or the science of textiles.
The case study emphasizes to students that scientists no 
longer adopt a strictly passive approach to history. Instead, 
scientists now take a forensics approach to major historical 
events, bringing sophisticated analytical tools to scrutinize 
why certain events unfolded. 
Far from being a set of agreed 
upon immutable facts, the 
historical record is open to 
reexamination and reinterpre-
tation. 
The case study also demon-
strates to students the “perfect 
storm scenario” —how a pro-
gression of unlikely or unfore-
seen events often results in a 
catastrophic failure. 
Next, we showcase how 
scientists and engineers often 
test analog materials in lieu of 
actual substances if those sub-
stances are prohibitively rare, 
precious, expensive, or dangerous to test.
Finally, using an ASTM protocol for determining the flam-
mability of textiles demonstrates the importance of opera-
tional definitions in scientific experiments. Students will see, 
perhaps for the first time, that operational definitions involve 
the comparison of phenomena of interest against a known 
standard.
“This great floating palace”
Well, here it comes, ladies and gentlemen … No 
wonder this great floating palace can travel through 
the air at such a speed, with these powerful motors 
behind it … The sun is striking the windows of the ob-
servation deck on the eastward side and sparkling like 
glittering jewels on the background of black velvet.1
The zeppelin LZ 129 Hindenburg (Luftschiff Zeppelin 
#129) was launched on May 4, 1936, as the premier passenger 
aircraft of the world’s first airline, Deutsche Luftschiffahrts-
Aktiengesellschaft (DELAG), or the German Airship Trans-
portation Corporation. Named in honor of the late President 
of Germany, Paul von Hindenburg, the ship was the largest 
zeppelin ever to fly, stretching an incredible 803.8 ft in length 
and boasting a maximum diameter of 135.1 ft. In comparison, 
the Titanic was 883 ft in length while a modern Boeing 747 
is only 250 ft. A double-decked gondola, constructed mainly 
inside the hull to reduce aerodynamic drag, provided passen-
gers with unparalleled luxury: 72 sleeping berths, washrooms, 
dining room and bar, pressurized smoking room, and spa-
cious lounge. A promenade with slanted windows allowed 
passengers to gaze upon the scenery below. With four revers-
ible 1200-hp diesel engines and cruising speed of 76 mph, the 
Fig. 1. The Hindenburg disaster, May 6, 1937. (Public Domain)
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 To understand the Hindenburg’s final approach to the 
Lakehurst Naval Station, note that wind direction refers to 
the direction from which the wind is coming. Also, naviga-
tional directions are denoted as follows: “bow” refers to the 
front of the ship; “stern” refers to the back of the ship; “port” 
refers to the left side of the ship (when facing forward); and 
“starboard” refers to the right side of the ship (when facing 
forward). Facing an easterly wind, Pruss approached the air-
field at 7:08 p.m. from the southwest at an elevation of about 
650 ft to observe ground conditions (Fig. 2, Point A). At 7:09 
p.m., he initiated a wide descending turn to port in order to 
dock the ship pointing into the wind. This would maximize 
the ship’s aerodynamic stability as passengers disembarked 
(Fig. 2, Point B). Sammt lowered the Hindenburg’s elevation 
by releasing hydrogen in 15-second intervals from various 
ventilation shafts as the ship turned. At 7:16 p.m., Pruss was 
lining the ship to the east at an elevation of about 400 ft when 
the wind shifted from easterly to southwesterly, forcing Pruss 
to again turn the ship for docking, this time facing southwest 
(Fig. 2, Point C). With deteriorating weather conditions, little 
room to maneuver, and anxious to land, Pruss decided to 
execute a tight S-turn rather than make another large looping 
pass over the airfield. He ordered a sharp turn to port fol-
lowed by a sharp turn to starboard. Sammt continued to vent 
hydrogen from various gas cells to lower the ship’s elevation 
to 350 ft. At some point prior to, or during this S-turn, the 
ship began to run heavy in the tail because at approximately 
7:18 p.m., Sammt ordered two drops of 300 kg of water ballast 
from the stern and valved five seconds of hydrogen from the 
bow (Fig. 2, Point D). At 7:19 p.m., with the tail still heavy, 
Sammt ordered one last drop of 500 kg of water ballast from 
the stern and sent six crewmen to the front of the ship to help 
lower the bow. Finally, at 7:21 p.m., the ship was at an eleva-
tion of 300 ft and roughly pointed into the wind (Fig. 2, Point 
E). Although the ship was still heavy in the tail, the forward 
grounding lines were dropped. A light rain began to fall. The 
metal frame was now electrically grounded by the landing 
lines.
airship provided the quickest means of crossing the Atlantic, 
cutting the typical transit time of contemporary ocean liners 
in half.2  
The ship was classified as a rigid airship because of its steel 
frame. Within the steel structure were 16 large gas cells (or 
bladders) made of gelatinized latex, designed originally to 
hold inert helium gas. However, at that time, only the United 
States, which had stockpiled the nonflammable gas as a by-
product of its mining of natural gas, had enough helium to 
supply a fleet of airships. Even though the U.S. Helium Con-
trol Act of 1927 prohibited American export of helium to any 
foreign nation, DELAG was hopeful it could convince the U.S. 
government to export it. Unfortunately, tensions between the 
United States and Germany deteriorated so the export ban was 
never lifted. Therefore, DELAG made the decision to trade 
safety for cost and reengineered the bladders to hold seven 
million cubic feet of hydrogen as the lifting gas. Converting to 
hydrogen also had the added benefit of giving the Hindenburg 
more lift, increasing its capacity to an impressive 242.2 tons of 
gross lift and 112.1 tons of useful lift. From the ship’s control 
room, the crew could drop water ballast or release hydrogen 
gas from ventilation shafts along the top of the ship to adjust 
its buoyancy and trim. Last, the steel structure was covered by 
panels of cotton cloth doped with various compounds. These 
panels were stitched together to form a single, and presumably 
electrically continuous, “skin.” The flammability of this outer 
covering plays a pivotal role in the current debate surrounding 
the ship’s destruction, so we postpone a detailed description of 
the fabric until later. By May 1937, the Hindenburg was mak-
ing the first flight of its second season of service, having al-
ready completed several safe trans-Atlantic journeys in 1936. 
Public confidence in hydrogen-filled airships was soaring.
“The ship is riding majestically toward us”
The ship is riding majestically toward us like some 
great feather …. It’s practically standing still now; 
they’ve dropped ropes out of the nose of the ship, 
and (uh) they’ve been taken ahold of down on the 
field by a number of men. It’s starting to rain again. 
On what would be its final voyage, the Hindenburg left 
Frankfurt, Germany, at 7:16 p.m. on May 3, 1937, under the 
command of Captain Max Pruss and First Officer Albert  
Sammt. This was Pruss’s first time commanding the Hinden-
burg. The ship was scheduled to arrive at Lakehurst, NJ, at 
6:00 a.m. on May 6, but unusually strong headwinds caused it 
to run several hours behind schedule. As the ship approached 
New Jersey, it encountered a storm before reaching the Lake-
hurst Naval Air Station at 4:15 p.m. The airfield was under the 
command of Charles Rosendahl, who radioed the ship to de-
lay landing until weather conditions improved. By 6:22 p.m., 
the storm had passed but conditions were rapidly worsening. 
Rosendahl radioed the Hindenburg, recommending “the earli-
est possible landing.”
Fig. 2. Approach of the Hindenburg. The thickening red line 
represents a lowering elevation of the ship.
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brought a swift end to the era of zeppelins. The public would 
never again feel safe aboard one. Subsequent investigations 
by the United States and Germany were inconclusive in deter-
mining the cause of the fire. For years, scientists, politicians, 
and military personnel put forth several theories as to the un-
derlying causes of the disaster. Was it sabotage? No evidence 
of sabotage was ever found. Was it a lightning strike? Unlikely 
—the outer covering of the ship had several burn holes, some 
as large at five centimeters in diameter, proving the ship had 
survived in-flight lightning strikes during its first year of ser-
vice.4 Today, a reexamination of the evidence leaves us with 
two competing theories that at least agree on the fire’s source 
of ignition. As the Hindenburg passed through the storm off 
the New Jersey coast, it became electrically charged. When 
the landing lines touched the ground prior to docking, they 
“earthed” the Hindenburg’s steel frame but not every panel of 
the ship’s fabric covering. A spark between the charged panel 
of fabric and the grounded steel frame ignited some source of 
fuel. The difference between the two theories lies in identify-
ing that source of fuel.
• Leaking hydrogen gas: The most likely explanation of 
events is that the electrostatic discharge ignited leaking hy-
drogen gas. Recall that during the sharp S-turn, Sammt was 
unable to correct the ship’s trim. Experts agree that the ship 
was undoubtedly leaking hydrogen from the stern.3 What 
caused the leak? One theory suggests that the S-turn was un-
commonly tight and that one of the rudder’s bracing cables 
may have been overstressed to the point where it snapped and 
slashed through a gas cell.5 Maybe something as simple as a 
sticky valve was at fault. Regardless of the cause of the leak, an 
explosive mixture of hydrogen gas and air floated above the 
ship’s tail. Because this theory blames the ship’s demise on the 
decision to land after the storm and on the S-turn made just 
prior to docking, it was strongly refuted by Pruss and Rosen-
dahl, both of whom always maintained the ship fell victim to 
sabotage.
“It’s burst into flames!”
It’s burst into flames! … and it’s crashing! It’s 
crashing terrible! Oh, my! …. It’s smoke, and it’s 
in flames now; and the frame is crashing to the 
ground, not quite to the mooring mast. Oh, the hu-
manity! And all the passengers screaming around 
here .… Listen, folks; I … I’m gonna have to stop 
for a minute because I’ve lost my voice. This is the 
worst thing I’ve ever witnessed. 
Using eyewitness accounts to determine the origin of the 
fire proved confusing, but the first sign of trouble appears 
to have been at the top, rear of the ship, just in front of the 
vertical fin.3 Both R. H. Ward (stationed with the port bow 
landing party) and R. W. Antrim (stationed atop the mooring 
mast) testified that they noticed a fluttering of the ship’s outer 
cover at this location — suggesting hydrogen was leaking out 
of a rear interior bladder against the outer covering.3 Crew-
men in the control stations of the lower fins testified hearing 
“muffled detonations” near the top of the ship. When they 
looked up, they saw bright red and yellow reflections of fire.3 
By 7:25 p.m., a yellow flame appeared on the outside of the 
ship at this spot. Within seconds, the tail section was engulfed 
in flames. The ship managed to stay afloat for a few seconds, 
but eventually the tail section sank, slamming crew and pas-
sengers 15-20 ft backwards into the rear walls of the control 
room, cabins, dining lounge, and promenade. As the Hinden-
burg tilted upward, the fire traveled inside the ship along the 
central axis until a blowtorch of fire erupted from the nose 
(Fig. 3). Crewmen stationed in the bow were incinerated. 
Most eyewitnesses described the Hindenburg as burn-
ing from the inside out. Within 30 seconds, the entire ship 
crashed to the ground and rolled slightly starboard. In gen-
eral, passengers and crew in the promenade or public areas 
near the outside of the ship were able to jump to safety while 
those deeper inside the ship (interior cabins and control sta-
tions) did not. Fortunately, many passengers had gathered in 
the promenade to watch the landing. Some family members 
lived or died based merely on a few feet of separation. Pruss 
and Sammt stayed with the ship until it hit the ground. Both 
men survived the crash, but Pruss was badly disfigured from 
burns he received carrying crewmen from the wreckage. On 
the ground, Herb Morrison had been assigned to cover the 
landing because of his prior work in broadcasting from an 
airplane. Normally, he would have been in Chicago cover-
ing a live musical program. After the tragedy, the 16-inch 
green lacquer disk recordings of Morrison’s account, which 
were actually damaged by debris from the burning airship, 
were flown by airplane to Chicago and broadcast that night 
from radio station WLS. In 1987, a small memorial pad was 
dedicated on the 50th anniversary of the tragedy. The pad is 
located on the site where the Hindenburg’s gondola landed.
Theories
Film footage coupled with Morrison’s audio account 
Fig. 3. The final moments of the Hindenburg. As the bow angled 
upward, a blowtorch of fire erupted out of the nose. (Public 
Domain)
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undergraduate students. We started by presenting students 
with the historical background information described in the 
previous sections. Next, we emphasized two concepts: (i) The 
goal of our activity is not to prove or disprove the IPT, but to 
showcase how physics can be used in the real world, and (ii) 
Even though our activity focuses only on a vertical flame test, 
it gives us a quantitative understanding of how flammability 
is tested and how results can be used to unravel the Hinden-
burg disaster (obviously, combining our results with those 
from a horizontal flame test would provide a more complete 
analysis).
• Sample preparation:  Because purchasing chemicals is 
expensive and heavily regulated, reproducing the Hinden-
burg’s outer fabrics is simply not possible for most teachers. 
Instead, we chose to test three fabrics that were easy to make 
and inexpensive to buy, yet nicely approximate the outer cov-
erings of the airship. First, we purchased swatches of pure cot-
ton cloth and ironed them. Next, we purchased clear lacquer, 
black primer with iron oxide as its tinting agent (iron oxide 
black pigment, in powder form, can also be purchased on-
line), and a concentrated aluminum resin paste (our specific 
type was Genesis LV 1060 from Sherwin-Williams Paints). To 
create the fabric that approximates the covering on the upper 
portion of the ship, we rolled cotton swatches with a layer of 
clear lacquer, then a layer of black primer, then three layers 
of aluminum paste. To create the fabric that approximates 
the covering on the lower portion of the ship, we rolled cot-
ton swatches with a layer of clear lacquer, then three layers of 
aluminum paste. After the coatings dried, we were left with 
samples of pure cotton cloth and two stiff, reflective fabrics 
that approximate the fabric on the lower and upper portions 
of the Hindenburg. Students trimmed each of these three 
samples into five strips (12 in x 3 in) and weighed each strip. 
Each strip was placed into a frame of sheet metal that secured 
the strip on two sides, leaving the bottom edge exposed. The 
frame was clamped together at four locations and suspended 
in a laboratory hood.
• Testing: A flat black poster background and dimmed 
lights were used to enhance observation of burning fabrics 
inside the hood. Precautions were taken to minimize drafts in 
the hood. No attempt was made to control ambient tempera-
ture or pressure. No attempt was made to move the strips nor 
to test a horizontal orientation of the strips. Each strip was 
tested and the average of five strips was reported per fabric. 
A Bunsen burner, with 10-mm inside diameter barrel, was 
used to create a 1.5-in high 99%-pure methane flame. The 
burner could be swiveled so that the exposed edge of the strip 
was exactly 0.75 in above the top of the burner. The flame 
was applied for 12 ± 0.25 s (flame-to-strip), as measured by a 
stopwatch. Students filmed each trial using cell phone cam-
eras in “slow motion” mode [Fig. 4 (a)]. Once the flame was 
removed, students continued to film the strip until any visual 
flame or glow self-extinguished [Fig. 4(b) and (c)]. These vid-
• Incendiary paint:  In 1997, engineer Addison Bain put 
forth the idea that at least early in the fire, the ship’s outer 
covering itself, and not leaking hydrogen gas, was the primary 
source of fuel for the fire.6 The cotton cloth that covered the 
ship was doped with different mixtures based on cellulose 
acetate butyrate (CAB), the base resin for what are commonly 
called lacquers. The portion of cloth covering the lower half of 
the ship was doped with a layer of pure CAB, then three layers 
of CAB mixed with aluminum powder. The portion of cloth 
covering the upper half of the ship was doped with a layer of 
pure CAB, a layer of CAB mixed with iron oxide, and three lay-
ers of CAB mixed with aluminum powder. These coatings gave 
the ship its distinctive reflective appearance and were used to 
keep the outer skin taut for aerodynamic purposes as well as 
to protect it from wind, water, and small objects. The added 
layer of iron oxide on the upper portion of the ship protected 
the interior gas bags from damage by UV radiation and over-
heating from IR radiation. Bain developed his theory when he 
realized that these compounds are similar to the components of 
thermite, a pyrotechnic composition that resembles a common 
sparkler or the propellant in the space shuttle’s solid rocket 
boosters. In short, Bain argued that the Hindenburg’s outer skin 
was essentially a gigantic sparkler. According to Bain, the elec-
tric discharge was energetic enough to ignite the skin and cause 
a dramatic exothermic reduction-oxidation reaction; therefore, 
this idea has become known as the “Incendiary Paint Theory” 
(IPT). The IPT has merit for two reasons: (i) Hydrogen burns 
with an invisible flame, yet the Hindenburg was consumed in 
an enormous yellow and red fireball. One might conclude that 
something other than hydrogen was burning. (ii) The ship held 
its position for a few seconds before the stern crashed to the 
ground. One might conclude that the gas cells were intact when 
the fire started. To test his idea, Bain obtained an actual rem-
nant of fabric from the Hindenburg and ignited it with a con-
tinuous spark. The piece burned as a brilliant yellow burst that 
looked like a miniature version of the Hindenburg disaster.7
Combining physics and history in the 
laboratory
We used the IPT as the basis of a new, inexpensive lab ac-
tivity focusing on a previously untapped topic in our course, 
namely the flammability of fabrics. Since the IPT posits that 
the propagation of the fire was due to burning of the Hinden-
burg’s fabric, we designed an investigation to quantify how 
fabrics burn after the source of ignition is removed. Our activ-
ity is modeled after the vertical flame test, ASTM D 6413-99 
—The Standard Test Method for Flame Resistance of Textiles 
(Vertical Test), which has been adopted as an accepted federal 
test standard.8 This protocol is considered to be the most fun-
damental and commonly used test on flame resistant fabrics in 
the United States. To align with the ASTM protocols, English 
units are used throughout the analysis. The equipment and 
materials needed to create this activity cost under $30 and were 
readily obtained from local hardware, fabric, and automo-
tive refinishing stores. We piloted our activity on a cohort of 
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• “Vertical burn time” (designated as tlower or tupper), the 
time, extrapolated from the vertical burn rate, needed 
to burn a 106.1-ft long swatch of the strip (i.e., ¼ of the 
Hindenburg’s maximum circumference). Because the 
upper and lower portions of the ship were covered in 
different fabrics, the maximum vertical distance a fabric 
could burn is ~¼ the maximum circumference of the 
ship.
• “Total vertical burn time,” the total time needed to 
burn vertically one entire side of the ship. This time 
was determined by adding the vertical burn times for 
the fabrics covering the lower (tlower) and upper (tupper)
portions of the ship.
• Results:  Table  I shows data from a typical run of our ac-
tivity. Results support the notion that leaking hydrogen, and 
not incendiary paint, is the most plausible source of fuel for 
the fire that consumed the Hindenburg. The outer fabrics just 
do not burn at a fast enough rate to consume a ship the size of 
the Hindenburg in a timeframe of the order of a minute. After 
burning strips of pure cotton cloth, students dramatically see 
that the dopants used on the Hindenburg’s fabric actually re-
tard the spreading of fire. The dataset below shows that a fire 
would need ~112 minutes to burn a distance roughly equal to 
the height of the ship, that is to say, from the underside to the 
topside of the ship. Experiments conducted by A. J. Dessler 
on horizontal burn rates support our results and show a fire 
would need 11-12 hours to burn a distance roughly equal to 
the length of the ship.9,10  Dessler discounts the two merits 
of the IPT explaining that the yellow fireball was actually the 
fabric, wires, and steel girders burning with visible flames in 
the invisibly burning hydrogen (as a mantle burns visibly in 
a lantern, even though the gas that is actually burning may be 
eos would be used only to determine the duration of time, to 
0.1-s resolution, that the samples burned and/or glowed. Any 
signs of melting or dripping were noted. If a portion of the 
strip remained intact, the strip was removed from the metal 
frame so that students could apply the following specific tear-
ing force to the strip: A crease was made running lengthwise 
through the peak of the highest charred area and parallel to 
the side of the strip. A hook was inserted into the strip 0.25 
in from the charred edge. A weight was attached to the hook 
depending on the strip’s weight per unit area (100 g for strips 
68-203 g/m2; 200 g for strips 204-508 g/m2; 300 g for strips 
509-780 g/m2; and 400 g for strips over 780 g/m2). With the 
hook in place, students grabbed the other side of the charred 
edge and raised the strip in a smooth, continuous motion 
until the tearing of the strip along the crease stopped. Many 
strips were totally consumed by the vertical flame so tearing 
the strip was not necessary [Fig. 4(c)]. 
• Analysis:  Using their video clips and a ruler, students de-
termined or calculated the following: 
• “Afterflame,” the time when a visible flame remained on 
the strip, as determined from the cell phone video clips. 
• “Afterglow,” the time when a visible glow remained on 
the strip, as determined from the cell phone video clips.
• “Char length,” the distance from the exposed edge of 
the strip to the furthest point of visible damage after the 
tearing force was applied, as determined by measuring 
the damaged portion of the strip with a ruler. Note that 
the char length is 12 in if the strip is totally consumed by 
the fire. 
• “Vertical burn rate,” calculated as the char length di-
vided by the afterflame.
Fig. 4. Our apparatus for vertical flame testing. (a) Start of flame test. (b) Afterflame. (c) Afterglow.
(a) (b) (c)
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study perhaps provides the first opportunity 
to introduce students to testing standards and 
how the responses of materials and products 
are determined. 
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invisible). Also, as the hydrogen burned the outer fabric and 
rushed out of the bladders, air rushed in. This created updrafts 
at the tail of the ship that were strong enough to keep the ship 
momentarily afloat—just as a burning piece of paper is lifted 
by the updraft created by its own fire. Finally, a 2007 episode 
of the popular show “Myth Busters” (Episode 70 —“The Hin-
denburg Mystery”) found similar results and suggested that the 
IPT, at least in the open sources, is doubtful.11 Although the 
episode is not peer reviewed and should be viewed with some 
skepticism, it is a phenomenal visual resource available to any 
teacher and can be shown to students to emphasize or solidify 
certain concepts. The episode serves as a good closure activity 
and can be downloaded from iTunes for $1.99. 
Conclusion and future considerations
The 80th anniversary of the Hindenburg disaster presents 
a compelling case study that brings powerful teaching op-
portunities to a variety of disciplines. First, the anniversary 
raises historical awareness in our students while bringing 
real world applications of physics to them. Next, the physics 
of flammability can be treated appropriately at the introduc-
tory level since only careful measurements of time, distance, 
and weight are needed. In fact, our case study can serve as a 
start-of-the-semester laboratory exercise where safety, mea-
surement, and error analysis are emphasized. Conversely, our 
case study can also serve as a capstone project in a senior-level 
engineering course after which each student is required to 
examine another engineering failure from history (e.g., Cher-
nobyl, Three Mile Island, the collapse of the Tacoma Narrows 
Bridge, the Challenger disaster, etc.) and design an experi-
ment with relevant operational definitions to test proposed 
hypotheses. Third, the resulting analysis shows students that 
just as scientific theories are open to reexamination in the 
light of new or confounding observations, so too are historical 
events open to revisitation and scrutiny. Next, the case study 
demonstrates to students how a cascade of unlikely events 
can result in an unpredictable catastrophe and how scientists 
and engineers often test proxies when actual materials are un-
available or prohibitive to examine directly. Finally, our case 
Weight 
per Area
(g/m2)
Afterflame
(s)
Afterglow
(s)
Char 
Length
(in)
Dripping
or
Melting
Vertical
Burn 
Rate
(in/s)
Vertical Burn 
Time
(min)
Cotton cloth
114.8 4.1 5.5 12 No 2.9 7.3
Approximation of fabric covering lower portion of ship
287.0 30.1 32.4 12 No 0.40 tlower 
= 53.2
Approximation of fabric covering upper portion of ship
344.4 33.4 36.8 12 No 0.36 tupper 
= 59.1
Total Vertical Burn Time = tlower + tupper
112.3 min
Table I.
